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- Theory and an Empirical Application to the Case of Spain -
I. Introduction
The problem of how to make an optimum use of a country's limited
productive resources is often a crucial one to the policy makers in
less developed countries (LDCs). Not surprisingly, therefore, the
various methods of cost-benefit analysis have attracted much atten-
tion among professional economists and are finding a wide spread
application in evaluating the social profitability of investment
projects and in the planning decision-making process as well.
Relatively less attention has been paid to yet another criterion of
project appraisal in a developing country that has been developed
independently of social cost benefit analysis - the so called
domestic resource cost (DRC) approach to project appraisals. This
approach is properly regarded as the application of the propositions
of allocation theory when the project, or the industry in question,
produces (or saves) foreign exchange.
The DRC concept compares the opportunity costs of domestic re-
sources (primary factors such as labour, capital, land) conmitted
Remark: We wish to express thanks to our colleagues Ulrich Hiemenz
and James Riedel for very helpful discussions during the preparation
of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
See, for instance3 M. Bruno, Interdependence, Resource Use and
Structural Change in Israel (Jerusalem: Bank of Israel, 1962),
pp. 104 sqq. -A.O. Krueger,
 ;'Some Economic Costs of Exchange
Control: The Turkish Case", The Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. 74 (1966)3 pp. 466-480. - M. Bruno, "The Optimal Selection of
Export-Promoting and Import-Substituting Projects", Planning the
External Sector - Techniques, Problems and Policies (New York:
United Nations, 1967), pp. bo-135. - B. Balassa and D.M. Schydlowsky,
"Effective Tariffs, Domestic Cost of Foreign Exchange, and the
Equilibrium Exchange Rate", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 76
(1968), pp. 348-360. - M. Bruno, "Domestic Resource Costs and Effec-
tive Protection: Clarification and Synthesis", The Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 80 (1972), pp. 16-33. - A.O. Krueger, "Evaluating Re-
strict lonist Trade Regimes: Theory and Measurement", ibid., pp. 48-62. -
B. Balassa and D.M. Schydlowsky, " Domestic Resource Costs and
Effective Protection Once Again", ibid., pp. 63-69.- 2 -
to the production of final goods with prices at which these goods
can be exported or imported - the latter prices (the foreign ex-
change gained or saved) being considered as the ensuing benefits
from production. The rationale for using the foreign exchange
gained (through exports) or saved (through imports) as a standard
of reference is that foreign exchange is relatively, and often
critically, scarce in many developing countries.
A simple numerical example may serve to illustrate the basic
idea of the DRC concept. Consider an economy which faces the question
of whether it should locally assemble the imported parts and com-
ponents to a passenger car, or whether it should directly import the
car. The equilibrium exchange rate is assumed to be 1 2 = 10 P (P.
being the currency of the country in question). Now suppose that the
car, if imported, costs the country 2 1,000 (P. 10,000 when converted
at the equilibrium exchange rate); in the alternative case of
assembling the car at home, the country has to import parts and
components for3 say, 2 850 (P. 8,500), while using domestic labour and
capital which cost, say, P. 1,000. This means that a domestic value
added of P. 1,000 (2 100) is generated through assembling, which is
lower than the international value added embodied in the (imported)
car (2 150 or P. 1,500). Obviously, the assembling of the car would
be efficient from a social point of view. Had the same amount of
labour and capital cost the country, say, P. 2,000 (instead of P. 1,000),
which could be employed elsewhere, it would have been profitable for
our country to import the whole car and to shift the domestic resources
to other activities in which it is a relatively more efficient
producer vis-a-vis the rest of the world.
It should be clear from the above example that the DRC criterion is
closely related to the familiar concept of comparative advantage in
international trade. A country has a comparative advantage in a particu-
lar activity if its domestic resource cost of foreign exchange is lower
than the equilibrium exchange rate (units of domestic currency per dollar),
The lower the domestic resource cost, the more worthwhile is the activity- 3 -
for the economy as a whole. This ex ante applicability apart, the DRC
criterion can also serve ex post purposes in the sense that it shows
the costs that the current industrialization and trade policies,
which deviate from the norm of comparative advantage, impose on the
society as a whole.. It is in this ex post notion that the DRC criterion
bears some relationship to the-well known theory of effective protec-
tion (ERP). High and differential domestic resource costs are then an
indicator of welfare losses resulting from the impact of trade-
restricting or trade-promoting measures on relative prices.
The recent debate on the DRC concept, which has been concerned
mainly with its relationship to the ERP criterion, has thrown up a
number of interesting issues. It seemss however, that the discussior
has also given rise to some confusion not only as to how to measure
domestic resource costs of alternative activities but also as to what
the measure is really all about. This paper represents an attempt
to clarify the basic theoretical concept of the domestic resource cost,
providing at the same time a brief survey of the contemporary state
of discussion surrounding this subject. Moreover, it is intended to
apply the DRC criterion to data for one particular semi-industrialised
country - Spain - with the view to examining the feasibility of this
approach in quantifying, in terms of domestic resource costs, the
aggregate impact of pursuing policies of import substitution and
export promotion.
TT, A Two Commodity, Two-Factor Model
The ideas underlying domestic resource costs can perhaps best be
illustrated with the help of the standard neo-classical model of
international trade. Consider an economy with the following production


















Ly)X and Y are the physical outputs of two commodities; L and K
are the economy's total endowments of labour and capital respectively,
where Kx, Lx and Ky, Ly are the labour and capital employed in the
two industries; (1) and (2) are the production functions for X and
Y respectively. Assume perfect competition, no transportation costs,
absence of non-traded goods, constant returns to scale, a given
international price ratio (Py/Px) implying that price elasticities
of both the export demand and the import supply are infinite within
the relevant range, and optimal trade policies (if any). The economy's
production possibilities curve, F (X, Y) = 0, is assumed to be concave
to the origin, showing increasing opportunity costs of producing X
and Y. Assume further (this assumption will soon be dropped) that
the production of X and Y use no intermediate inputs so that the
unit final product prices equal their respective unit value added.
Now recall that domestic resource cost is an expression for net
benefit to be derived from producing a commodity where its benefit
is the world price at which the product can be sold or imported
(foreign exchange earned or saved) whereas cost is the opportunity
cost of production (i.e. its value added, the primary factors being
priced at their opportunity costs). We can write, in a general
form,
(^~) R = P
W r - lYa V + T f
J J e L ij i h hj
where B- is the net benefit from j (j = X, Y); P™. is the world
J J
price of j and r is the equilibrium rate of exchange (domestic
currency per unit of foreign currency); a.. is the amount of input
i (i = X, Y) required per unit of producing j; P- is the price
of this input, f^ is the amount of primary factor h (h = K, L)
required for producing a unit of j, and g^ is the per unit price
(equal to opportunity cost) of h, the superscript d referring to
domestic prices. In equilibrium, commodity prices will equal their- 5 -
average costs of production and since by our assumption a-•
are equal to zero, the world price P^- is the per unit direct value
added measured in world prices, which, when compared with the per
unit direct value added measured in domestic prices (the opportunity
cost of domestic resources), provides the sign of net benefit, B..
J
In the absence of trade restricting measures such as tariff and
quotas, the two value addeds for a product may differ, because an
economy's resource endowments may be different from that of the rest
of the world, thus conferring it with comparative cost advantages
on one or other product depending on the nature of production tech-
nology (i.e. factor intensity requirements, which we assume to be
stable and non-reversible within the relevant range of prices for
a product).
Under conditions of increasing opportunity costs, the product
transformation curve is shctm in Figure I by the curve aa; the
slope of the straight lines dd and ww are the domestic and world
prices of commodity X and Y in terms of each other. As the price
of Y in terms of X is assumed to be higher abroad than at home,
the economy's comparative cost advantage lies in the production of Y.
At point c, where the domestic price ratio is tangent to the
transformation curve, the domestic resource cost of producing OX.,
of X exceed the benefit to be derived from international exchange
(the world price of X) whereas the net benefit is positive for
producing OY. of Y. Hence, it will pay the country to shift
resources out of X and into Y, moving production from c (the
optimal production and consumption point before trade) towards f
(the optimal production point after entering into trade). In Fig. I
the domestic value added (which is also the value of total output
since intermediate inputs are absent) of OX. of output, measured
in terms of Y. is equal to OY,, whereas the same amount of output
measured in world prices has a much lower value added, equal to OYp
(note that the lines YpX^ and Y^JL are parallel to the price
ratios ww and dd, respectively). On the other hand, the inter-
national value added of OY^ amount of output, measured in terms
of X, is equal to OX^, which is much larger than the corresponding- 6 -
FIGURE I.
value added measured in domestic prices, OX,,, indicating that
the production of Y involves a positive net benefit to the
economy. The production combination at f represents a welfare
increase since the price line ww will be tangent to a higher
indifference curve (assuming a map of such curves which do not
intersect). That the international value of the product mix is
greater at f than at c (implying a potential welfare increase)
is seen clearly by letting the international price line pass through
c and observing that through resource reallocation the economy
extracts an extra Y^Yj- amount of Y (or an equivalent amount
measured in terms of X).- 7 -
III. Introducing Intermediate Inputs
The argument developed above remains essentially unchanged
when intermediate inputs are introduced into the production functions
but all the other assumptions are retained. Introduction of inter-
mediate input means that a distinction now has to be drawn between
the gross and net production possibility (or transformation) curves
and the corresponding gross and net outputs at a given commodity
price ratio. We consider, first, the simplest case of two goods
where each good is required in the production of the other but not
in its own production; the input coefficients are, moreover, assumed
I)
to be constant. All goods are tradable but domestically produced,
and no intermediate inputs are imported. In terms of notations
already used we can write
(6) x = X (Lx, Kx) - a^ • Y (Ly, Ky)
(7) y = Y (Iy, Ky) - a^ • X (Lx, Kx)
where x and y are the net (or final) outputs of X and Y and
a and a^ are the fixed input coefficients. The derivation of
the net production possibility curve a la Vanek ' and the meaning of
domestic resource costs in situation of intermediate inputs are
1)
If, instead, variable input coefficients are assumed, this will
change the shape of the net production possibility curve with-
out basically altering any of the arguments concerning domestic
resource costs.
2)
J. Vanek, "Variable Factor Proportions and Interindustry Plows
in the Theory of International Trade", The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 77 (1963), pp. 129 sqq.- 8 -
FIGURE II
shown in Figure II.
The purve cc is the economy's gross transformation curve
1) between X and Y. At the domestic price ratio dd , the economy
produces the commodity combination B i.e. OY. of Y and OX^
of X, requiring as intermediate inputs
production of Y) and Y1 1
X2 of X (in the
of Y (in the production of X).2)
QYO of Y and 0Xp of X are then available for final demand
1")
Note that we are still assuming that the domestic price ratio is
different from the world price ratio because of the differences
in comparative cost advantages and not because of trade restrict
ting measures like tariff and quota. The measurement of domestic
resource cost, however, needs to be modified to take account of
such trade restricting measures, as will be shown below.
' The tangents of angle a and B are the required input
coefficients, a and ax .- 9 -
(either for home consumption or for exports) and the point B'
is obtained (on the net production possibility curve) as the meeting
point of the two straight lines dropped from Yp and Xp. By
allowing the price line to vary, the economy's "net" transformation
curve c'c
1 is derived by joining the locus of all such "meeting
points"; any one point on this curve shows the commodity combination
which is available for final demand at that price ratio and the
corresponding point on the curve cc (the gross production possi-
bility curve) then shows the total output combination.
According to equation (5), the total domestic resource cost of
producing a commodity is its direct plus indirect value added, the
latter being the value added of domestic primary factors of production
embodied in the domestically produced intermediate input used up in
its production (which is the same as the total value of intermediate
inputs used, since no imported inputs are involved). In figure II,
the direct domestic value added of producing Y^L (= 0X1) of total
output of X is ML, YpM being the value of intermediate input
Y..Y,, but measured in domestic prices in terms of X (note that
1) the line Y,jM is drawn parallel to the domestic price ratio).
By definition, YpM is identical with the indirect value added in
the production of X and therefore the total (direct plus indirect)
domestic value added is the domestic value of tctal output YpL -
a familiar result when commodities and primary factors are measured
at their real opportunity costs. By similar reasoning, the value of
total output 0Y1 (= X^B) is also the total value added of producing
that amount of Y. Analogous to Figure I, by drawing appropriate
lines (i.e. by converting the domestic values of output into world
prices) at the world price ratio shown, the net benefit of producing
See St. Guisinger, "Negative Value Added and the Theory of
Effective Protection", The Quarterly Journal of Economics;,
Vol. 83 (1969), pp. 4l^~: I- 10 -
Y is seen to be positive and that of X negative, implying that
potential Pareto improvement is possible by transferring resources
to the production of Y.
IV. Considering Imported Intermediate Inputs
We now assume, more realistically, that production of commodities
involves the use of not only domestically produced inputs but also
imported inputs. In other words, production has a foreign exchange
cost which must now also be deducted from the benefit (foreign ex-
change earned or saved) in order to arrive at a more accurate
measurement of the net benefit. For the sake of simplicity we assume
that the domestically produced inputs do not use any imported inputs
in their own production and that they are used in a fixed proportion
with imported inputs in the production of final goods. The formula (5)
can now be rewritten after Bruno as:
(8) B'. = f P» - m. ] te - [ j a.. r". • j fh.
where m. is the foreign exchange cost (i.e. the cost of imported inputs)
J
of producing one unit of j, and the other notations retain their former
meaning. The first term on the right hand side of the above expression
is the per unit net foreign exchange earned or saved measured in domestic
currency and the second term is the corresponding total domestic resource
cost (direct and indirect value added) of producing one unit of j. As
before, any activity whose net benefit, B'. , is positive will indicate
J
a comparative cost advantage in production, either for export promotion
or for import substitution depending on the relationship between the
world price and domestic price ratios. By writing the expression for
1)
M. Bruno, "Domestic Resource C^sts and Effective Protection:
Clarification and Synthesis", op. cit.- 11 -
total value added in the numerator and that for net foreign exchange
1) earned or saved in the denominators Bruno ' derives an expression for
the total domestic resource costs of earning or saving a unit of
foreign exchange 3 d. , which, when compared with the real equilibrium
J
rate of exchanges r , provides an alternative way of estimating an























producing j is negative and activities which are socially profitable
are only those for which d- < r .
Now consider the situation where production of final goods* requires s
apart from imported (direct) inputs, also domestically produced inputs
which themselves use imported inputs in their own production. The final
1)
M. Bruno, "Domestic Resource Costs and Effective Protection:
Clarification and Synthesis", op. cit.
2)
If all intermediate inputs are traded (i.e. in the present case
imported), so that m- = E a- • P
w- , we obtain
(8b) d. h
P
W. - E a. .P
W
J i
DRC is then the ratio of unit value added measured in domestic prices
to unit value added measured at world prices. Although it looks sus-
piciously akin to the familiar ERP formula, the similarity is de-
ceiving. In the ERP the numerator is measured at tariffWIistorted prices,
whereas in the case of DRC it is measured at the opportunity costs of
domestic primary factors.
If the world price is affected by a country's exports (i.e. when the
small country assumption no longer holds), then the marginal revenue
from exports (or the marginal import cost) is the relevant measure
of gross foreign exchange earned or saved. Infinite elasticities of
export demand and import supply is not an essential assumption for
measuring domestic resource costs.- 12 -
production, in other words, involves direct and indirect foreign
exchange costs, the sum of which must be substracted from the total
foreign exchange earned or saved (in the denominator of (8a)). To
clarify what is involved consider, as a very simple example, the
production of machine tools which uses, as direct intermediate
inputs, imported machinery and steel which is domestically produced.
Assume further that the production of steel requires two intermediate
inputs, coal which is imported and the domestically produced iron ore.
Under these simplifying assumptions, in calculating the unit domestic
resource cost, the numerator of (8a) will consist of the direct
value added of domestic primary factors in producing one unit of
machine tool, plus the domestic value added of producing the required
steel input plus the domestic value added of producing the amount of
1") iron ore required for the production of steel, the primary factors
at all stages being priced at their real opportunity costs. In the
denominator, the sum of the foreign exchange costs of the imported
machinery and that of coal has to be substracted from the unit
world price of machine tool.
It has been assumed thus far that imported inputs are used in
the production of domestic inputs as well as directly in the production
of final output. It may be the case, however, that an intermediate
input, such as steel in our previous example, is partly domestically
2) produced and partly imported. In that case, the foreign exchange
cost of the imported part will be included in the denominator of d- ,
J
together with other direct and indirect foreign exchange costs. The
1)
The calculations will stop at this stage only if iron ore production
does not in itself use any domestically produced intermediate input.
If it does, then all the further backward linkages will have to be
taken into account in computing the total value added of producing
the machine tool. If iron ore production uses imported machinery,
this will be considered as indirect foreign exchange costs of pro-
ducing one unit of machine tool and has to be entired into the
denominator of (8a).
2)
The theoretical implication of this possibility for the standard
factor proportions theorem in international trade has been examined
by J. Riedel, "Intermediate Products and the Pure Theory of Inter-
national Trade: A Generalization of the Pure Intermediate Good Case",
mimeo draft, Kiel Institute of World Economics, September 197^.numerator of d- will then include, apart from the direct value
J
added in the final stage of production, the indirect domestic value
added of that part of intermediate inputs which is domestically
produced. It is also important for the purpose of DRC computation
to draw a distinction between the imported and the domestically
owned (or produced) primary factors. If management? for instance,
is partly recruited from abroad and partly indigeneous, then the
"imported" part is included in the denominator as foreign exchange
costs, whereas the price of using local management, measured at its
opportunity cost, is included in the numerator as direct value added;
other primary inputs are handled in a similar way.
V. Domestic Resource Cost and the Effective Rate of Protection
To recapitulate, in its ex ante interpretation the domestic
resource cost is a measure of a country's comparative cost advantage
in alternative activities. It compares the international free trade
value added per unit of output in an economic activity with the per
unit value added measured in domestic prices, where the domestic
primary factors are priced at their real opportunity costs. If the
former exceeds the latter, i.e., if the activity's net benefit is
positive, potential welfare can be increased by diverting resources
from the uses in which the net benefit is negative (or lower) to
this activity. The DRC criterion thus provides a norm which indicates
the direction in which resources ought to be allocated. It is in this
sense that the DRC concept bears a close relationship to the familiar
theory of effective protection. The effective protective rate shows
the degree by which the value added in any particular economic
activity exceeds, thanks to restrictionist trade regimes, what this
value added would be if the same activity were fully exposed to inter-
national competition. The standard formula for effective protection,
EP, in the j-th activity is given as:
VAD. - VAF. VAD.
(9) EP. = * i = i - 1
J VAF. VAP.FIGURE III.
d'
w
where VAD. is the activity's per unit value added at tariff-
inclusive domestic prices and VAP- is the per unit value added at
the world (or free trade) price. One of the various possible uses
of the ERP is the assessment of the relative incentives which protec-
tion provides to particular industries, i.e., the appraisal of the
resource allocative effects. This is done by comparing an actual
post-tariff situation of resource allocation with the one which would
prevail in the free trade, given the set of domestic and world prices.
The domestic resource cost, on the other hand, compares the situation
of pre-trade resource allocation in the absence of tariff and other
trade restricting measures (this is the rationale for measuring the
price of inputs and domestic primary factors at their ppportunity costs)
with that of- resource allocation under the free trade, again under the
given set of world and domestic prices. The difference between the two
concepts is perhaps best understood in terms of the standard neo-
classical model of trade (Figure" III).15 -
The line ww iss as before, the world price ratio, dd is the
pre-trade domestic price ratio in the absence of tariff and other
trade restricting measures and d'd' is the domestic price when a
tariff is imposed on the good X. The DRC measure compares the inter-
national value of the commodity combination at c , with that at f ,
whereas the conventional ERP measure compares the latter situation
with the international value of the commodity combination at g
(namely the point at which the economy has actually settled down
after the imposition of tariff). Although the final message of both
the DRC and the ERP measures is the same, namely that potential
welfare can be increased by moving towards the point f , it is
important, nevertheless, for the purpose of actual interpretation,
to keep the conceptual distinction between the two clearly in mind.
Once, however, the possibility is ignored that the domestic price
of a commodity (with factors measured at opportunity costs) in the
absence of tariffs and other trade restrictions (but before trade)
need not necessarily be identical with the international free trade
price but may lie anywhere between the free trade price and the
tariff-inclusive price, the distinction between the ERP and the DRC
is blurred and attempts have indeed been made in the literature to
relate one measure to the other. Thus under the assumptions that all
goods are traded, transportation costs are nil, factors of produc-
tion are internally perfectly mobile but internationally perfectly
immobile, and domestic markets are perfectly competitive, Anne
1) Krueger ' defines the domestic resource cost of a unit of foreign
exchange in the activity as:
do,
A.O. Krueger, "Evaluating Restrictionist Trade Regimes...",
op. cit., p. 5^.-16-
where a.. is the amount of the i-th input required per unit of
output of j, t. and t. are the nominal tariffs on output and
inputs respectively, VAD is the domestic and VAF the foreign
value added per unit of output of j. The numerator of (10) is the
unit direct value added of domestic primary factors, measured in
tariff-inclusive domestic prices (the indirect value added need not
concern us here because all intermediate inputs are, by definition,
imported), whereas the denominator is the net foreign exchange
earned (or saved). Prom this definitional identity, Krueger con-
cludes that if and only if the above cited assumptions hold that
the ranking of industries by their ERP and their DRC, and thus the
resource-pull and the resource-push developments indicated by both
measures, will be identical. '
?) Bela Balassa and Daniel Schydlowsky , reach just the opposite
conclusion from the way they look at the relationship of DRC to ERP.
Their definition parallels our formula (8a), but expresses it as
percentage excess of direct and indirect value added in producing
domestically commodity j over the corresponding total value added
in world prices. In symbols:
(11) d. = -
3 I
E VAD. • r.. l IJ
3 IVAP. • r..
where r.. are the elements of the inverted Leontief-matrix. After
using the formula for the effective protection (10) to define
' A.O. Krueger, "Evaluating Restrictionist Trade Regimes...",
op. cit., pp. 5^-55.
' B. Balassa and D.M. Schydlowsky, "Effective Tariffs, Domestic Cost of
Foreign Exchange and the Equilibrium Exchange Rate", op.cit., pp.350-351.
In the Balassa-Schydlowsky formulation, it is not clear at all
whether they are using the total or the domestic input coefficients.
It should be emphasized, that it is only the latter which matters.
This point has also been stressed, though in a somewhat different
context, by J. Riedel in his "Factor Proportions, Linkages and the
Open Developing Economy", Kiel Working Paper, No. 20, July 1974.- 17 -
VAD- = VAF. (1 + EP-) and by substituting this expression into (11),
one obtains
VAF. • r..
(lla) d. = l + z EP. ^
x I VAF. • r..
This formula by Balassa and Schydlowsky shows that if industries
differ from each other in their contribution of total value added
to final output produced under free trade conditions, domestic
resource cost and effective rates of protection will provide a
different ranking of these industries.
Is it meaningful to attempt to establish a formal relationship
between the ERP and DRC in the way different authors have done? It
seems not. As has been repeatedly stressed in this paper, the
proper measure of domestic resource cost of a commodity is the one
in which the domestic primary factors are measured at their real
opportunity costs, i.e. after correcting for the distortionary effect
of tariffs (and other trade restricting measures) on domestic price
relations. The domestic value of marginal product of primary
factors in a protected industry will normally be higher than the
international value of their marginal products, because the
domestic price of a unit of this industry's output will be higher
than the unit world price. The value added measured at domestic
prices in situation of tariff will then not reflect the real oppor-
tunity costs of the primary factors in the protected industry. Yet
Krueger, in defining the numerator of equation (10) as the per unit
domestic resource cost of an activity, apparently makes an ad hoc
departure from the implications of the true DRC concept without
explicitly recognizing it or even defending the necessity for such
1) a departure. This ad hoc departure from the accepted definition of
This is all the more surprising since Krueger does, in fact, state
explicitly in the earlier part of her above mentioned article that
the numerator of the DRC formula should be the domestic opportunity
cost of domestic resources employed.- 18 -
DRC is also apparent in Balassa and Schydlowsky's work cited above.
Thusj it would seem quite illegitimate to substitute (as they have
done) the per unit domestic value added term from the formula of
effective protection into that of the DRC formula, when it is
recognized that the per unit value added in the ERP formula is
measured in situation of tariff while in the DRC it is (and should
be) measured at the domestic opportunity costs of domestic primary
factors.
VI. Assessing the Allocative Costs of Foreign Trade Regimes
Our last remarks imply that the DRC and the ERP, although
closely related (in that both are based on the principles of allo-
1) cation theory), are separate concepts in a formal sense. This
formal distinction between the two may tend to disappear, however,
if the DRC concept is used for ex post purposes. Most developing
countries are known to employ a variety of trade restrictive devices
such as quotas, tariffs, domestic input-content requirements, import
predeposits and so on. Apart from balance of payments reasons, such
regulations are mainly aimed at initiating and then promoting
domestic industrial growth through import substitution. As the
process of import substitution moves forward, these countries sooner
or later face the need to spill over into manufactured export ex-
pansion at a significant scale. Responding to this need frequently
requires the introduction of export incentives of various kinds.
' It should also be noted, that the DRC approach involves considera-
tion of all stages in the production process, whereas the ERP
concept involves only the first stage. In the ex ante applica-
tion, the ERP method is a partial equilibrium form of analysis
while the DRC concept is closer to a general equilibrium form
of analysis.- 19 -
The question then is whether or not the protection from imports
and/or subsidies to exports were in excess of those actually needed
to get particular activities started. While it is now widely
agreed that much of import-substituting industrialization in develop-
ing countries has been excessive and wasteful, it is not certain
that the more outward-oriented developing countries of today are
always aware of the costs of their export policies. Where protection
in favour of import substituting industries is high, export incen-
tives have to be equally high in order to make exports feasible in
spite of high domestic costs. In extreme cases, the level of export
incentives will deprive the country of the net gains from exporting
and will simply subsidize the foreign importers. The ex post DRC
measures tend to indicate the opportunity cost incurred by an economy
in pursuing policies of import substitution or export promotion and
may provide guidelines for rational policy actions. It would, for
instance, be rational for a country to alter or discontinue policies
which are found to sustain activities with high resource cost s of a
unit of foreign exchange but which neglect those with low-resource
costs ("high" or "low" in relation to some accounting rate of
foreign exchange).
In assessing ex post DRC, the existing input-output structure
of the economy is taken as given and the direct and indirect value
added of primary factors in an activity is measured at domestic
market prices (net of indirect taxes and subsidies) and compared
with the actual net foreign exchange earned or saved by the economic
activity. Since the factor prices are usually distorted in a
developing economy (neither the wage rates nor the interest rates
reflect the real opportunity costs of labour and capital), one can
try to measure the ex post DRC after correcting for the factor market
distortions in order to see whether the ranking of the industries
according to their ex post DRC at uncorrected prices is changed after
the corrections are introduced. It is important to note that since
the ex post DRC approach is oriented towards quantifying the actual
rather than a hypothetical (as would be the case with ex ante DRC)- 20 -
domestic resource cost of a unit of foreign exchange, the official
rate of exchange (which may be different from the equilibrium rate)
can be used in the calculation of the net foreign exchange saved
(through import substitution) or earned (through exports).
As long as the existing input-output structure is taken as
given, the DRC approach in the ex post sense may fail to make a
straightforward distinction between the efficient and inefficient
industries of the country in question. An industry may show a high
resource cost of a unit of foreign exchange not because it is in-
efficient as such but simply because it is dependent for its supply
of inputs on an industry which itself is inefficient. The textile
industry may be socially profitable in a less developed country but
only if the textile machinery is imported. If the domestic produc-
tion of textile machinery is inefficient and has a high foreign
exchange cost, and if domestic producers of textile are required
to use only domestically produced textile machines, the resource
costs of a unit of producing textile will conceivably be very high.
However, there is, as Bruno has suggested, a way of overcoming this
problem and thus locating the source of inefficiency. It consists
of running two sets of DRC estimates: one using the existing
structure of production in an activity and the other assuming the
major tradable inputs for the activity are imported. If the source
of inefficiency lies indeed in the domestic sector, the latter
estimate of DRC of a unit of foreign exchange will then be .substanti-
ally lower than the former estimate.
VII. An Example of the Application of the DRC as an ex-post Measure:
The Case of Spain
The evidence available up to now on the domestic resource cost
of foreign exchange incurred by the various economic activities in
developing countries is rather limited. There are estimates for
Israel where, according to Bruno, the use of the DRC criterion,- 21 -
1) ex-ante and ex-post, has a long tradition. Estimates are also
?) i) U) available for Turkey, Chile-" and India. It seems that the
difficulty in getting the required data has been limiting a wider
application of the DRC criterion in the past. This may now be
changing, however, as more suitable input-output tables are be-
coming available and as an increasing amount of field research
is being devoted to gathering price and cost information from
individual producers. '
Spain is a case in point. Among the semi-industrialized countries
of today, Spain provides an outstanding example of economic isola-
tion and autarchy for a long period (until the late 1950s), followed
by a more outward looking strategy involving a greater integration of
domestic industries into the world economy. During the last decade,
this country has experienced a more rapid pace of industrial develop-
ment than at any time before in this country. The average annual rate
See, M. Bruno /'Interdependence, Resource Use and Structural Change
in Israel", pp. 104 sqq.
2)
See, A.O. Krueger, "Some Economic Costs of Exchange Control",
op. cit., pp. 470 sqq.
•" See, L. Taylor and E. Bacha, "Growth and Trade Distortions in Chile
and Their Implications in Calculating the Shadow of Foreign Exchange",
in: R.S. Eckaus and P.N. Rosenstein-Rodan (eds.), Analysis of Develop-
ment Problems - Studies of the Chilean Economy. (Amsterdam, London,
New York: North Holland and American Elsevier Publishing, 1973),
pp. 130 sqq.
4)
See, Ch.P. Staelin, "The Cost and Composition of Indian Exports",
University of Michigan, Centre for Research on Economic Development,
Discussion Paper No. 22, May 1972.
•* Estimates of DRC are reportedly under preparation for a number of
countries in the context of the project on "Foreign Trade Regimes
and Economic Development" sponsored by the National Bureau of
Economic Research, Washington D.C. See also in this connection, as
an outgrowth of the Kiel Institute of World Economics' project on
"Import Substitution and Export Diversification in Selected Develop-
ing Countries", the recent study by M. Girgis, "Industrialization
and Trade Pattern in Egypt", mimeo draft (Kiel 1974).- 22 -
of growth, over 10 percent in real terms, was among the highest
both in the developing world and in the industrial countries. The
same holds for the expansion of both imports and exports. Economic
planning (of an indicative nature for the private sector), on which
the Spanish government embarked in 1964, as well as its trade policy,
which involves a number of regulatory measures aimed at protecting
home industries against import competition and at promoting domestic
production for exports, have been playing a major role in determining
the economic progress in the recent past. '
It would seem worth while, therefore, to examine these policies
in terms of domestic resource costs in order to form an idea about
their economic efficiency. If the policies pursued by the Government
have been optimal, we will expect the DRCs of the import substituting
and export activities to be lower than the (equilibrium) exchange rate.
To the extent that the resource costs of some industries are found to
be higher than the exchange rate, economic policies have failed in
achieving an optimal resource allocation. The country would have been
better off had the Government encouraged the high DRC industries to
redeploy their factors of production in enterprises with lower DRCs,
i.e. those having greater comparative advantage.
Our brief analysis will be addressed to the following questions:
- Do domestic resource costs of a unit of foreign exchange differ
from activity to activity and, if so, to what extent?
- To what extent does inefficient domestic production of major
material inputs generate high domestic resource cost in producing
the final output?
1)
For a detailed analysis see, J.B. Donges, "Prom an Autarchic
Towards a Cautiously Cutward-Looking Industrialization Policy:
The Case of Spain", Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 107 (197D,
pp. 48 sqq. - Idem, "Shaping Spain's Export Industry", World
Development, Vol. 1, September 1973, pp. 19 sqq.- 23 -
- Is there any significant relationship between the DRCs and
various performance indicators such as the growth of output,
of domestic supply, of exports and of competitive imports?
- How does the ranking of activities according to the DRCs
compare with the ranking provided by the effective rates of
protection?
Two sets of DRC estimates for Spain have been attempted. The
first set refers to particular manufactured products, which are
either pure import substitutes or are goods also sold abroad.
The major source of data on domestic and world market prices
as well as on cost structures are interviews conducted in 1971
and 1972 with individual'manufacturers and producers' associations.
The selection of products is not based on a random sample; rather,
it only reflects our "success" in extracting information from
Spanish entrepreneurs. Domestic prices are ex factory and net of
indirect taxes; world market prices are the prices of competitive
products in the European Common Market as reported by the inter-
viewees themselves. The second set'i estimates is sector-wise. It is
based on the Spanish input-output tables for 1962 and 1968 con-
taining 86 productive sectors, of which 56 belong to the manufacturing
industry. Domestic prices are producer's prices; world market prices
have been obtained by deflating the domestic prices of output and
material inputs with the corresponding nominal tariffs.
The product-DRCs have been derived, in accordance with (£a),
using the following formula:
(12) dj = CD : Xp
where C^ (expressed in pesetas) is the domestic price of the
product minus the foreign exchange component, and Xp (expressed
in US-2S) is the EEC price for the same product minus the import
component of the Spanish firm's output.The results for 100 products, referring to the late 1960s,
are shown in Table 1. It should be emphasized that the estimates
are rather crude for a number of reasons. We took only the direct
imported inputs into account because we did not get any information
on the import component of domestically supplied material inputs.
This might have biased the results and also affected the ranking
of products according to DRCs. Additional imperfections in our
measurements are due to the fact that for lack of information we
had to disregard non-r traded inputs and could not adjust the cost
item for inter-firm differences in both the degree of capacity
utilization and external economies. Nontheless3 the numerical
results obtained are rather instructive in indicating the degree of
allocative inefficiency of Spain's industrial and trade policies. The
unweighted average DRC for the sample as a whole is 73.82 pesetas per
dollar, as compared to the exchange rate of 70 pesetas to a dollar
which prevailed (in the late 1960s). In addition, there is an
appreciable variation in DRCs among products3 ranging from 11.74
(cigarettes), to 171.11 (radio sets)3 the standard deviation being
26.91. This seems to imply that governmental policy has been rather
indiscriminate in promoting industries.
Of the 100 products under consideration, it appears that 56
are rather efficiently manufactured from a general economic point of
viextf, involving domestic resource costs which are lower than the ex-
change rate. Most of these products are those in which Spain un-
disputedly has a significant, although not yet fully realized}
export potential. This is particularly true of canned vegetables and
fish, woolen textiles, shoes, household furniture, engine-generator
sets, small-sized passenger cars, busses, medium-sized vessels, and
firearms. It should be noted, however, that since our sample happens
to consist of relatively successful firms, these DRC estimates do not
necessarily reflect the typical situation of the industries concerned,
as will be shown below. The evidence is quite different on the import-
substitution side, where most of the products have domestic resourceTable I Estimates of Domestic Resource Costs by Products in Spain
(Pesetas per US-SS)
Sector / Item



























Wood & cork manufactures incl. furniture








Manufacture of printed cards
Ordinary offset paper
Rubber products































































































Machinery, parts and appliances
Engine-generator sets
Milling machines
Gramophone records (33 rev.)
Sewing machines (automatic)
Sewing machines (non-automatic)











Television receiver (61 cm)
Washing machines (large size)
Universal turning lathes
Vacuum cleaner plus 7 accessories (750 w)
Radio sets (medium size)
Transport equipment
Passenger cars (up to 1.500 cc)
Busses (large size)
Medium-sized vessels (up to 30.000 grt)
Diesel locomotives








Data refer to different years in the
late 1960s.















































Source: Data provided by Spanish firms and producer's associations.- 26 -
cost of above 70 pesetas, in particular a number of durable con-
sumber goods, chemicals and steel products. The existence of these
high-cost products is perfectly consistent with the general view
among observers of the Spanish economic scenario that it is here
where import substitution has been pushed excessively far, leading
to a number of structural weaknesses which inhibit many firms in
these industries from becoming internationally competitive. In the
case of steel products, the problem of high DRCs is particularly
serious because of their cost-raising impact on other manufactured
goods for which steel is a major input. In sum, the DRC estimates
seem to indicate that a more selective industrialization policy
placing more emphasis on activities with comparative advantage
would have increased the net foreign exchange earnings and/or
savings from the available resources.
Let us now consider Spain's sectoral DRCs. Using the familiar
input-output technique, formula (8a) can be rewritten as follows:
Z v . • s..
(13) d. = -± j = 1 ..., n
J P . - E m. • s..
where s. • stands for the elements of the inverted Leontief matrix
—1 of domestic material inputs, (I-D) , required by the j-th sector;
v. is the unit value added in the i-th activity (measured in
domestic prices), m. is the import requirements (measured in
foreign prices) for the unit production of the commodity i and
P™; is the world price (or the free trade price) of the commodity j.
The numerator of d- is the direct and indirect domestic resource
J
costs of producing one unit of j for final demand; the denominator
is the net foreign exchange earned or saved (depending on whether
it is an export or import substituting activity), the second term
in the denominator being the direct and indirect foreign-exchange
cost of producing one unit of final demand in j. The main problem
of applying the above formula is that of measuring the denominator- 27 -
in world prices. As there is no methodologically satisfactory way of
solving this problem, we have made some crude estimates assuming that
world prices of the traded commodities, converted at the current ex-
change rates equal domestic prices deflated by the sectoral nominal
tariff or tariff equivalent. After normalizing world prices at unitys







\ + t. i 1 + t. ' ij
where t. and t. represent the customs tariffs on the finished
product and its material inputs (we obtained them by dividing tariff
revenues by the value of imports at c.i.f. prices, as provided by
the Spanish input-output tables).
1) The results of the calculations, given in index number form,
are presented in Tables 2 and 3. In interpreting and comparing them
with the product-wise estimates, one has to keep in mind that the
sectoral data conceal, as was suggested by Table 1, a great deal of
differences among the firms within a sector. What is more, the input-
output matrices automatically take into account the great number of
small firms which are typical of virtually every single sector in
Spain, including those sectors (like the chemical industry, iron and
steel industry, and transport equipment) in which the minimum efficient
size requirements are, for technical reasons, quite high. That might
explain to some extent why the sectoral DRC estimates tend to be higher
than the product-wise ones. Keeping in mind these facts, our estimates
lend support to the following inferences:
The index numbers facilitate inter-temporal comparisons of DRCs,
since the exchange rate in Spain changed from 60 pesetas to a

































































































































































































Canning and preserving of fruit and
vegetables
Sugar factories and re fineries




Canning and preserving of fish
Miscellaneous food preparations
Wine industries
Distilling, rectifying and blending
of spirits
Other beverage industries







Preparation* and sawing of lumber
Wood manufactures (incl. funiicurt)
Cork industry
Paper and pulp industry
Manufactures of paper and cardboard
Tanning industry
Leather products
Rubber and asbestos products
Plastic articles
Synthetic materials
Basic chemical industry (incl. fertilisers)






Iron and steel industry
Kon-ferrous motal industry ""*
Metal castings industry
Finished cetal products








Motor cycle and bicycle industry
Aircraft industry
Jewellery, sport goods and toys

















































































































































































































































































































































a) For method see text.
Prin-irily export-oriented industries (X) are those in which the export-production ratio is higher than
!0 percent and th.in thf import-total supply ratio. Primarily irr.'Ort-competing industries (M) are those
in which rhe inipr.rt-total supply r.i:io is higher than 10 percent and than the export production ratio.
In the regaining industries (A) both ratios are lower th.in 10 percent.
Source: Calculated fro=i Organijacion Sindical Espaiiola, Tablas input-outp'it dg la ecor-.pnia cspar.ola. 1962,1968.Pirst3 as before there is a wide variation in the domestic resource
costs by activities. This is especially true for the manufacturing
sector.
Second, manufacturing production is, on average, more expensive in
terms of domestic resource costs than production in the primary and
tertiary sector, particularly so in 1962 (Table 2). In that year,
the average domestic resource cost for the manufacturing sector,
being 1.2323 times the current exchange rate, exceeded the average
DRCs in the primary sector by 16 percent and that in the tertiary
sector (including construction) by 27-3 percent. By 1968, the
picture has changed somewhat. The manufacturing sector was still
relatively more costly than the other two although the difference
had narrowed down to 11.2 and 18.5 percent, respectively. One is
tempted to associate these findings, to an important extent, with
the shift in the industrialization strategy aiming at the gradual
opening up of the Spanish economy initiated in 1959 and which
probably did correct, during the 196O's, some of the significant
misallocation of resources introduced in the previous period of
exclusively inward-looking industrialization.
Third, on average, production for manufactured exports do not appear
to be the cheapest means of earning foreign exchange. The average
domestic resource cost of industries classified as export-oriented
was, in 1968, 1.2271 times the current exchange rate, while the
corresponding DRC for import-competing industries was 1.3486 (or
1.1844 excluding the extreme value found for railroad equipment)
and that for autarchic industries (called "autarchic" for lack of
a better term), 1.0895 (Table 3).
Fourth, Table 3 shows also that 7 out of 10 primarily export-
oriented industries experienced a reduction of domestic resource
cost between 1962 and 1968 as compared to 11 primarily import-
competing industries (out of 20) and 17 autarchic industries (out
of 24). It should be noted, in addition, that the two industrieswhich are commonly regarded as particularly successful exporters
- footwear and shipbuilding - have, contrary to the product-
related findings, relatively high domestic resource cost. This
implies that an indiscriminate promotion of exports does not
necessarily result in production which is profitable in terms of
net foreign exchange earnings. Indeed, a close look at these two
industries in Spain reveals much evidence suggesting the co-
existence of efficient and inefficient firms within each sector.
This is consistent with the supposition that industrialization
and trade policies have not been as selective as is desirable
from a resource allocation point cf view; rather they have allowed
inefficient producers to stay in the market.
Another point, which is also important to look at, is whether
all industries with high domestic resource costs are inefficient
in themselves or whether their DRCs reflect the use of high cost
inputs from other domestic industries. One way to deal with this
issue is, as we said above, through the assumption that the main
inputs are available at world market prices instead of being
procured domestically. For the purpose of measurement, the total
domestic and the international value added of the input(s) vhich is
now assumed to be imported must be substracted from the values
added corresponding to the final production in question. In
algebraic terms, formula (13) then needs to be rewritten as
follows:
I v
d. 8ij - (I E axj • v
d s. )
(14) d* - 1 ^-i—
3 P
w. - Z m. s.. - f( I 1 a . • m. s. ) + ( E a . • P
w )
I •111 * • Xl 1 IX AI A Jl
 J X1
J X
where a . is the value of input(s) x (which is assumed to be
imported) used per unit of j and P represents the world price
of the final product(s) x.- 32 -
We performed two sets of calculations. In the first one, after
adjusting the DRCs for the one most important inputs we arrive at
d • estimates as presented in Tables 2 and 3. In the second set,
J
adjustments for the three most important inputs xrere made, ob-
taining the estimates for d '. . If we look at Spain's major economic
sectors (Table 2) we find that, in 1962, the adjusted domestic
resource costs were appreciably higher than the original ones (with
the exception of the sector construction and services). By 1968,
these differences became rather small, implying an overall reduction
in allocative inefficiency. The more disaggregated estimates for
Spanish manufacturing industries (Table 3) indicate that in a number
of cases the high cost domestic supply industries apparently prevent
the final production from being more efficient in terms of domestic
resource costs, i.e. d- > d • > d- . Examples are: slaughtering,
J J J
grain mill products, canning and preserving of fish, oils and fats,
wearing apparel, printed matter, and aircraft industry. On the other
hand, there are many instances in which high-cost industries are in-
efficient in themselves, i.e. d. < d . < d . . Examples are wood
J J j
manufactures, paper and pulp industry, non-metallic mineral industry,
iron and steel, electrical machinery,and railroad equipment, apart
from some of the primarily export-oriented industries, such as wine,
cork, leather products, and shipbuilding. Once again, it turns out
that manufactured exports expansion during the 196O's was not cost-
less to the economy. This last conclusion leads us to the question of whether or not
there is an association between the rank order of industries according
to DRCs and the rank order according to their export performance and
other selected characteristics. For this purpose, we performed a rank
correlation analysis between the DRCs and eleven variables which, on
a priori grounds, could be expected to have some association with the
domestic resource cost. The results, summarized in Table H, suggest
that domestic resource costs are not strongly associated with any of
the eleven factors except, to some extent, vri.th effective protection
rates. This last correlation may lend support to the views of those- 33 -
Table 4 Spearman's Rank Correlation between DRCs and Selected Variables Concerning
Spain's Manufacturing Industry ''













Growth of industrial production
Growth of domestic supply
Growth of exports
Shares of intermediate inputs
in total output
Shares of imported inputs
in total inputs
Shares of imports in domestic
supply
Shares in exports in output
Shares of sectoral exports
in total exports
Effective rates of protection
Capital intensity















The sample consists, if not otherwise specified, of 56 industries,
the DRCs and the selected variables have been ranked in descending
Coefficients with an asterisk are not statistically significant at
5 percent level.













Source: Basic data for rows (1) - (8) are from the Spanish Input-Output-Tables
for 1962 and 1968. Effective protection rates are from L. Gamir,
"El proteccionismo arancelario en la Espana aptual", Informacion
Comercial Espanola, March 1972, p. 99 , and J.B. Donges, "Shaping
Spain's Export Industry", op. cit., p. 35. Capital-intensity figures
are also from this latter paper (p. 30). The Gini coefficients were
taken from J.B. Donges, "From an Autarchic Towards a Cautiously
Outward-Looking Industrialization Policy", op. cit., pp. 46-49.who argue that ex post resource allocation effects of trade policies
can be judged as well by looking at the ranking of industries
according to their effective tariffs. Besides, it should be noted
that there is a statistically significant (though weak) associa-
tion between DRCs and the growth of manufactured exports as well as
export-to-output ratios (in 1968). These observations again tend
to cast some doubt upon the overall social profitability of the
export pattern of the Spanish industries which existed in the
period under observation.
VIII. Concluding Remarks
Two interpretations of the domestic resource cost of a unit of
foreign exchange were outlined above - an ex ante definition and an
ex post definition. The ex post DRC estimates are, as we have tried
to show by a concrete case study, indicative of the economic costs
to an economy of pursuing unduly restrictive trade policies. The ex
ante DRCs are useful in evaluating the social profitability of
economic activities and investment projects, with a view to
determining the relative priorities of investments in accordance
with the most efficient use of the resources available (now and in
the future). The DRC approach to project appraisal is, however,
legitimate only if the output of the investment directly leads to
earnings or savings in foreign exchange (i.e. only in case of
export promoting or import substituting projects). Moreover, the
investment in question has to be sufficiently small in relation to
the country's national income so that its effect on relative product
prices in the economy can be assumed to be negligible. As was pointed
out in the text, the social profitability of economic activities or
projects can be estimated either by comparing the unit cost of pro-
duction directly with the benefit to be imputed to the activity (or
project) in the form of foreign exchange earned or saved, or by
comparing the direct and indirect resource cost of a unit of foreign
exchange with the equilibrium rate of exchange. The two methods will
lead to the same conclusion with regard to the acceptance or the- 35 -
rejection of an activity only, if all intermediate inputs and
primary factors (including foreign exchange) are priced at their
real opportunity costs.
In a less developed country, in which the markets are generally
distorted3 the relevant opportunity costs ought to be imputed by
appropriately shadow pricing the inputs and primary factors. The
shadow pricing, however, poses the real difficulty in determining
ex ante, the structure of comparative advantage (or disadvantage)
because of the limitations of the data base in most less developed
countries. Some of the problems associated with shadow pricing
will be dealt with tangentially in this concluding section with-
out, however, going into the details, which can be found in the
2) literature. ' Of crucial importance is the shadow pricing of
foreign exchange, of domestic labour (skilled and unskilled) and
of capital. In addition, if the net benefit approach to project
appraisal is desired, one has also to price at their opportunity
costs all those commodities that enter as intermediate inputs into
the project. The imported intermediate inputs will then be priced
at the opportunity cost of foreign exchange. The domestically pro-
duced non-tradable intermediate inputs should be priced at the
opportunity cost of the domestic primary factors used in their pro-
duction, after adjusting for the foreign exchange cost (again at its
accounting price), if any, of these inputs. How to price the trade-
able inputs that are domestically produced? In one method of social
1)
If enough data were available for a country one could make use
of an optimising linear programming model and by fitting in
the relevant constraints into the model, could derive the shadow
prices from the solution of the dual problem. See H. Chenery,
"Comparative Advantage and Development Policy", The American
Economic Review, Vol. 51 (1961), pp. 221-237.
2)
' See, for instance, I.M.D. Little and J.A. Mirrlees, Project
Appraisal and Planning For Developing Countries (London:
Heinemann Educational Books, 1974) - UNIDO, Guidelines for
Project Evaluation (New York: United Nations, 1972).- 36 -
cost-benefit analysis the use of the relevant world prices has been
1) advocated as the appropriate procedure to adopt. Yet, in the
context of the domestic resource cost measurements this pricing
technique would seem to be quite inappropriate to use because
the domestic price of a unit of tradable domestic input, like
that of a unit of non-tradable input, should be equated to the
opportunity cost of the domestic factors used in producing it
(again after adjusting for any foreign exchange cost) and the world
2) price of this commodity is no index of the domestic opportunity cost.
As was pointed out already, a separate DRC estimate can, however,
be made at world priced intermediate inputs and compared with the
DRC estimate based on domestic priced (at opportunity cost) inputs
in order to locate the inefficient sectors in the existing input-
output structure of a commodity. When the list of domestic input
in the production structure is rather long, the work of imputing
the domestic price at opportunity cost to each and every input
becomes quite involved. If, however, through input-output table
the information is available on the amount of direct and indirect
primary factors required per unit of a commodity's output produced,
then the DRC estimates can more easily be made by appropriately
shadow pricing the primary factors only.
It is well known that the practice of exchange control existing
practically in all•developing countries tends to make the nominal
price of foreign currency - a scarce factor - depart from its
opportunity cost. The demand for foreign currency is physically
controlled rather than discouraged by devaluating the home currency
presumably because the authorities do not wish to raise the price
of imported goods like food and machinery. Keeping the price of
1) ' I.M.D. Little and J. Mirrlees, "Project Appraisal ...", op.cit.
2)
See, E.J. Mishan, "Cost-Benefit Rules for Poorer Countries",
The Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 4 (1971), pp. 86-98.- 37 -
foreign exchange artificially low, however, entails a social cost
to an economy in terras of output lost since in place of highly
productive uses into which the foreign exchange would have been
put had its price been higher, it is encouraged to be used in
relatively low productive uses. In appraising investment projects
it is therefore necessary to correct the nominal value of foreign
exchange to allow it to reflect its true opportunity cost. Various
measures have been proposed to estimate the correct price of
foreign exchange, an excellent summary of which can be found in a
recent survey by Edmar Bacha and Lance Taylor. ' These two
authors themselves recommend the use of a shadow price that takes
free trade as a reference point - an equilibrium exchange rate
which is calculated in terms of volume indexes of exports and
imports.
It is widely recognized that the market price of labour in less
developed countries having overt and disguised unemployment is not
its true opportunity cost - there is substantial overpricing of
labour. It is often too hastily concluded from this that in
appraising investment project, labour should be assigned a zero
shadow price since it is withdrawn either from the pool of un-
employed or from agriculture where its marginal productivity may
be zero and therefore there is no loss of output to the economy
resulting from an additional employment. This view may be erroneous
for a number of reasons. First, agriculture is seasonal in nature
and during the periods of intense activity (sowing and harvesting,
for example), nearly all available farm hands may be busy. It is
necessary to study the seasonal pattern of demand in agriculture
before it can be concluded that no loss in output will result from
the transfer of labour from agriculture into a non-agricultural
1)
E. Bacha and L. Taylor, "Foreign Exchange Shadow Prices: A
Critical Review of Current Theories", The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 85 (1971), pp. 197-224. See also B. Balassa,
"Estimating the Shadow Price of Foreign Exchange in Project
Appraisal", IBRD Economic Staff Working Paper, No. 4
February 1973.- 38-
activity. Secondly, the opportunity cost of labour is positive if
there is a cost of transferring labour from one place to another
which the society has to bear. Third, the employment of a pre-
viously unemployed or underemployed labour may have a resource
cost to the society in the form of extra consumption of the
labourer resulting from the employment. Fourth, no unemployment
may exist for particular types of skilled labour which a project
may demand. Its market price is then perhaps the appropriate
opportunity cost. Hence, imputing a zero price to labour will not
be appropriate in all situations.
Just as labour is overpriced so is capital underpriced in most
less developed countries. Capital is subsidized in various forms
- not least because the exchange rate is overvalued. Cheap
development credit and various investment allowances artificially
reduce the price of capital, leading frequently to substitution of
labour by capital. It is therefore necessary to impute an accounting
price to capital, which, in the absence of better information, is
often taken as the marginal cost of foreign borrowing.
In our attempt to test briefly the appropriateness of DRC
estimates in the context of the Spanish economy, we did not make use
of shadow pricing, although there is reason enough for assuming that
factor prices are distorted in the directions described above. As there
are no capital stock and labour data broken down according to the
industry classification of the input-output table (the interviewed
firms did not provide us with such data either), the differences
between private and social costs have been ignored by us. Hence,
the numerical results offered should be regarded as approximations
rather than definite estimates. Instead of doing "intelligent guess
works" today, which may be subject to all kinds of errors and
may provoke a great deal of criticism, we feel that our own resources
are perhaps better allocated by waiting until such time as more
accurate information on Spain's primary factors of production become
available (hopefully with the first industrial census which is now,
reportedly, under preparation).